

CONFIDENTIAL

D/FBIS  
C/area

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM

Director, Foreign Broadcast  
Information Service

EXTENSION

NO.

FBIS-0429/85

DATE

18 October 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and  
building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom  
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)1. Deputy Director for  
Science and Technology  
Room 6E45, Headquarters

2.

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15.

Evan:

Attached is the memo from  
Senator Helms. SOVA has the  
action on question #1 which  
FBIS [ ] is helping  
with. (FBIS input is attached.)  
Also note the criticism on page  
one of Senator Helms' letter  
concerning the Avis Boutell book  
review.

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FBIS Response to Question No. 1 in the Helms 2 October Letter

FBIS from its inception, when it successfully applied propaganda analysis techniques to Nazi broadcasts, has engaged in the systematic analysis of tightly controlled media, particularly Soviet and Chinese media. The premise underlying this methodology is that such media are highly controlled, purposive, and sensitive instruments. Close and rigorous examination of changes and anomalies in the behavior of these instruments has over the years yielded significant insights into the policies and politics of the countries involved. These insights provide both heuristic and corroborative evidence for use in all-source analysis. The kind of rigorous scrutiny of the media that is required is a full-time, specialized occupation that cannot be diffused among all-source analysts.

16 Oct 85

C/FBIS/AG

Richard: Attached is the compilation of charges the DDE has asked us to respond to by the middle of next week.

Would appreciate having a one-paragraph answer to question #1 of 2 October Helms letter by

COB 22 Oct. If you want to send copies

of previous actions AG has done on this too, fine.

In comradely fashion,

STAT



SOVA/SIG  
Hq. Bldg 4E13

STAT

You can LDX the response....



# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	NIO/FDIA		X		
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	NIO/USSR		X		
19	NIO/SP		X		
20	D/SOVA/DI		X		
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

9 Oct 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

25- 3911

October 2, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In the past we have written to you seeking information about the long-standing problem at the Central Intelligence Agency regarding an apparent analytical bias which continuously under-estimates Soviet intentions and capabilities. Some have even characterized this bias as "pro-Soviet." We posed a series of questions, the answers to which would assist us in reviewing this problem, on April 25, 1985; to date no response has been received.

Now the problem has surfaced in public again. According to a recent newspaper article, the CIA's internal publication Studies in Intelligence, recently published a book review of a volume by two distinguished academic scholars on the topic of Soviet Disinformation. Soviet Disinformation is a very serious intelligence and political problem to which you, Mr. President, have personally called world-wide attention. Soviet Disinformation techniques are part of a larger intelligence problem which entails Soviet "Active Measures"—the so-called Maskirovka techniques of Camouflage, Concealment and Deception.

Yet according to the article attached, the review by CIA's publication reads as though it were written in Moscow. Instead of criticizing the analysis of the authors, it attacks the very concept that Maskirovka actually exists. Indeed, according to the information available, the CIA's review reads like a piece of disinformation itself, and appears to serve Soviet foreign policy interests. Of course, we do not have the actual text, so we ask that you supply the text to us. The article we seek is an unclassified review by Avis Boutell in Studies in Intelligence of the book Dezinformatsia by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson.

It seems strange for the CIA to be attacking the serious analysis of Soviet Disinformation, when the CIA should be taking the lead in unmasking Soviet Disinformation. This appears to be part of the well-documented, much larger problem at CIA--the long-standing habit of the CIA of under-estimating Soviet intentions and military capabilities. America is now faced with the dangerous implications of Soviet military supremacy, as you have confirmed by at least eight statements you have made since 1982, and by the numbers and trends in comparative U.S.-Soviet armaments.

The President  
October 3, 1985  
Page 2

In the most important measures of military power, the gaps between U.S. and Soviet capabilities are growing larger, not smaller, despite your vigorous Defense Modernization Program. We are still losing ground to the Soviets—and these gaps will continue to widen over the next five years. In fact, we are over 38 billion dollars behind President Carter's Five Year Defense Program, as you pointed out on March 22, 1985. Thus the "correlation of forces" has indeed decisively shifted against the United States, as Soviet political and military leaders frequently assert.

The bias of the CIA for under-estimating Soviet intentions and capabilities over the last 25 years has already had a deleterious effect on U.S. national security. But the recent implications of information resulting from KGB defections suggests that we should inquire further into the problem of this bias. Accordingly, we therefore request answers to the following additional questions as soon as possible:

1. Why does the CIA produce single-source analysis of Soviet and Communist Chinese open publications such as is done by Foreign Broadcast Information Service?

*SOVA  
service  
convened*

2. Is there an internal CIA review process to identify possible pro-Soviet bias in published unclassified or classified analytical products?

*DDI*

3. Was the attached article mentioned above screened to detect its possible pro-Soviet bias? If not, why not? If so, why was it published under the official imprimatur of the CIA?

*DDI*

4. Is there a possible pro-Soviet bias in many CIA products over the past 20 years?

*DDI*

5. Is there any evidence of the influence of possible pro-Soviet penetrations, moles or bias in the preparation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence products on the Soviet Union over the past 20 years?

*SOVA  
FICG  
ACI*

6. Has any important intelligence analysis or evidence related to the Soviet Union ever been withheld or suppressed within or by the CIA? Did any of this intelligence evidence or analysis reveal Soviet deception? What is the Counterintelligence significance of the suppression of intelligence on Soviet deception?

*SOVA  
ACIS*

7. Could a possible pro-Soviet bias have played a role in the prolonged and worsening CIA under-estimates of Soviet strategic forces in the 1960's and 1970's?

8. We have recent reports that the CIA:  
a.) Has further down-graded Soviet Backfire bomber range

*DIA/Air Force*

The President  
October 3, 1985  
Page 3

Bring  
as many

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where agency  
has been out  
in front.

- estimates;
- b.) Is negatively reassessing evidence of Soviet Biological and Chemical Warfare arms control violations;
  - c.) Is trying to change seismic verification methodology to make Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty disappear;
  - d.) Has down-graded the accuracy of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM in a belated attempt to disprove the B Team;
  - e.) Is denying and down-playing evidence of Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception (Maskirovka);
  - f.) Is denying the possibility of Soviet mole penetrations and deception in humint espionage channels;
  - g.) Has finally completed National Intelligence Estimate 11-11 on Soviet Strategic Deception after three years, but continues to deny Soviet SALT I negotiating deception on the size of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM, the range of the SS-N-8, the number of Soviet SLBMs in 1972, the "geographical asymmetries" rationale for Soviet SLBM superiority, Brezhnev's pledge not to build mobile ICBMs, Brezhnev's Backfire bomber pledge, Soviet-supplied Backfire bomber range data, and the Soviet SALT II Data Base.

ACIS  
OSWR

ACIS  
OSWR

NID/SP  
NO/SP Hutch

NID/SP

Are these recent reports correct? Are they best explained by an under-estimative analytical bias, a possible pro-Soviet bias, bureaucratic incompetence, or all of the above?

9. Was John Paisley likely to have been a Soviet KGB mole inside the CIA, who may have been assassinated by the KGB in order to protect other CIA moles? What is the best assessment of Paisley's full career and death? Have traces of other CIA moles ever been detected?

?

10. Are reports that CIA has regressed into continued under-estimation of Soviet military spending correct?

NO!

SOVA

11. Did the CIA miscount both the Soviet ICBM and SLBM totals, the main limitations, during SALT I? Did Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception play a role in causing these miscounts?

SOVA

12. Did the CIA also fail to project either the heavy throw-weight of the SS-19 or the long range of the SS-N-8 at the time SALT I was signed in 1972? Was Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception involved in these under-estimates?

OSWR

13. Has the CIA consistently under-estimated Soviet global objectives and misunderstood Soviet arms control objectives?

SOVA  
NID/SP

14. Can at least five years of the 10 year 1980-1990 U.S. "window of vulnerability" be attributed to under-estimates by CIA of Soviet ICBM accuracies?

Turner NIES


In sum, we strongly agree with CIA Director Casey's initial assessment of the CIA's analytical track record made on February 13, 1981:

"The most frequent criticism is that our [CIA's] interpretations and assessments have shown a tendency to be overly optimistic, to place a benign interpretation on information which could be interpreted as indicating danger. It's our obligation to present conclusions which emphasize hard reality undistorted by preconceptions or by wishful thinking...I found in SALT I, for example, that some of the [CIA] judgements were soft. They leaned toward a kind of benign interpretation rather than a harder interpretation of assessing or viewing a situation as being more dangerous." (Emphasis added.)

We fear, however, that despite Director Casey's best efforts, the CIA's performance has not improved.

Thank you for your prompt response to these important questions. We also again request belated answers to our April 25, 1985 questions (letter attached.)

Sincerely,



Copies to:

Director, CIA  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Director CIA Counter-Intelligence  
National Intelligence Officer for Deception  
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff



The President  
October 3, 1985  
Page 5

National Intelligence Officers for U.S.S.R. and Strategic Forces  
Director, DIA  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board  
Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee

Attachments:

Washington Times Article "Misinformation on Disinformation" (July 16, 1985)  
Unanswered Symms-Wallop-Helms letter to the President of April 25, 1985

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 25, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President;

As you know, we have long been concerned about improving U.S. capabilities to verify arms control treaties with the Soviet Union. In addition, we have long been concerned with enforcing Soviet compliance, now that multiple Soviet violations have been confirmed.

As strategic arms control negotiations resume in Geneva, we have some additional concerns about U.S. ability to verify existing and proposed arms control treaties. We have a series of questions on arms control verification for which we request expedited answers:

1. In 1983, the CIA published a National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Soviet Arms Control Objectives." This NIE reportedly concluded that the Soviets would never sign an arms control treaty with the U. S. with the intention of violating it, but that the Soviets would merely exploit loopholes and ambiguities. This conclusion, however, contradicts the Defense Department Annual Report for FY 1985, which states:

"Several of these violations must have been planned by Soviet authorities many years ago, in some cases perhaps at the very time the Soviet union entered into the Agreements."

The NIE also contradicts your own Presidential Reports to Congress on Soviet Arms Control Violations of January 23, 1984, October 10, 1984, and February 1, 1985. Who was the Chief of CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff and the National Intelligence Officers for Strategic Programs and USSR when this NIE was written? Has the CIA's view of Soviet arms control objectives changed now that multiple Soviet violations have been confirmed?

The President

April 25, 1985

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2. In March, 1982, CIA Director Casey was interviewed by U.S. News and World Report on the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement ending the 1982 Cuban Missile Crisis. Casey stated that the Soviets had been violating this agreement since 1962 by deploying offensive weapons in Cuba. The Chief of CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff then, however, reportedly refused to admit that the Soviets had made any commitments under the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement. Did the State Department allow the CIA access to the diplomatic history of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement? Who was CIA's Chief of ACIS at that time? Has his view changed, in light of your own two public charges that the Soviets have violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement?
3. In September, 1981, the Soviets failed to give proper notification of their Zapad 81 military exercise under the terms of the Helsinki Agreement. Did CIA officially notify the Arms Control Agency of this fact, so that ACDA could make a Derwinski Amendment (Section 37 of ACDA Act) Report to Congress at the time? Who was CIA's ACIS Chief at the time? ACIS
4. In 1976, the Soviets sent their first Kirov class aircraft carrier through the Turkish Straits. Did CIA report this to ACDA at the time, so that ACDA could report it to the Congress as a Soviet violation of the Montreux Convention? Who was in charge of CIA's arms control intelligence at the time? Has CIA ever reported Soviet Montreux Convention violations to ACDA? SOVA
5. The Soviets have reportedly been engaged in a continuously expanding pattern of Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CCD) since the SALT I negotiations began in November, 1969. Yet the February 1978 Carter Administration White Paper on Soviet Arms Control Compliance states that when the U.S. brought this expanding pattern of Soviet Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception to the attention of the Soviets in the SALT Standing Consultative Commission in the Spring of 1975, the pattern ceased to expand. The 1978 Carter White Paper was incorrect, however. The 1979 Molander report to Congress on the verifiability of SALT II confirms that the pattern of Soviet CCD continued to expand. The pattern continued to expand since 1979, and has continued to expand through today. ACIS

The President  
April 25, 1985  
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This Soviet CCD is a violation of SALT I and SALT II, because it constitutes deliberate interference with U.S. National Technical Means of Verification. Soviet CCD has not been mentioned in either the January 23, 1984 or February 1, 1985 Presidential Reports On Soviet SALT Violations. Why? Who was CIA chief of arms control intelligence in 1978 and in 1984? Why has Soviet CCD not been reported to Congress as a SALT violation?

6. Has CIA at any time contradicted the judgement of the 1978 Carter White paper that Soviet CCD did not violate SALT? If so, then why was this judgement not part of the two Presidential Reports to Congress on Soviet Violations? If not, does CIA believe that Soviet CCD is consistent with the provisions of SALT I and SALT II? Who was CIA's chief of ACIS at the time of the 1984 and 1985 Presidential Reports?
7. Did CIA do a report that the Soviet SS-16 mobile ICBM was probably deployed in violation of SALT II prior to ACDA's "Sorrells" report in April 1982? Who was in charge of CIA's ACIS at that time?
8. The Conventional Weapons Convention entered into force on December 2, 1983. Yet since then there have been public reports that the Soviets have used booby traps designed to look like toys and cluster bomb anti-personnel munitions to maim and kill countless Afghan women and children in violation of the Conventional Weapons Convention... Has CIA reported these atrocities to ACDA, so that they could be reported to Congress under the Derwinski Amendment? Who was in charge of CIA's ACIS in 1983?
9. Has CIA's ACIS ever furnished to ACDA an Intelligence Report on the verifiability of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, so that ACDA could make a Section 37 report to Congress? Who has been in charge of arms control intelligence at CIA since 1967?
10. The Soviets have reportedly been testing surface-to-air missiles and radars in an Anti-Ballistic Missile mode since SALT I was ratified in 1972. Did CIA ever report this Soviet testing of SAMs in a prohibited ABM mode to ACDA, so that a report to Congress could be made? Who

The President  
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has been in charge of CIA arms control intelligence since 1972?

11. Has CIA issued a report to ACDA on Soviet arms shipments into the Western Hemisphere which may have violated the Rio Pact of 1947? Was the Marxist-Leninist government of Nicaragua a recipient of these contraband Soviet arms? Who is in charge of CIA's arms control intelligence?
12. Soviet Air Force Backfire bombers have reportedly been staged and based at Arctic bases beginning in 1983. Did CIA report this to ACDA so that a report could be made to Congress? Who was in charge of CIA's arms control intelligence?
13. In April, 1984, a salvo of multiple Soviet SS-20's was reportedly fired on a northerly azimuth aimed at the U.S. Did CIA report this to ACDA so that ACDA could report to Congress? Did this affect the CIA's assessment of whether the SS-20 might be a covert ICBM, and did this affect the CIA's assessment of the Soviet's SALT II Data Base? Who was in charge of arms control intelligence at CIA at this time?
14. Soviet Biological Warfare facilities reportedly continued to expand after the Biological Warfare Convention was signed in 1972, and they reportedly continued to expand after the Convention was ratified by the Soviets in 1975. Did CIA report these expansions to ACDA? How many innocent people have been killed since 1972 by Soviet Biological Warfare agents? Did CIA oppose the establishment of a BW Verification Interagency Group in the spring of 1976? Who was in charge of arms control intelligence then at CIA?
15. Have Soviet submarine tunnels impeded US verification of SALT I and SALT II? Are they completed? Did CIA report their hindrance of verification and their completion to ACDA, so ACDA could report to Congress? Who was in charge of CIA's arms control intelligence at this time?
16. Has the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy just turned down a RAND Corporation proposed study of Soviet Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception? Why?

The President

April 25, 1985

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Mr. President, these are all serious questions, which we request answers for as soon as possible. We are planning to request Senate hearings on the issues covered by these questions, as well as on the Constitutional aspects of arms control treaty making.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

*Steve Squares*  
*Melinda White*  
*Jane Helms*

Copies to: \_\_\_\_\_

Secretary of State of State

Secretary of Defense \_\_\_\_\_

Director, CIA \_\_\_\_\_

Chairman, JCS \_\_\_\_\_

Director, ACDA \_\_\_\_\_

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy \_\_\_\_\_